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Macro stress tests of UK banks 
Glenn Hoggarth, Andrew Logan and Lea Zicchino 
Bank of England 
1. Introduction 
Stress testing the vulnerability of financial institutions to adverse macroeconomic events is an 
important tool in assessing financial stability. Central banks and financial regulators increasingly use 
this approach in calibrating the risks facing the financial system. A number of recent policy initiatives 
also aim to formalise a role for stress tests. One of these has been the inclusion of stress tests in the 
IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAPs). Stress testing is also important as part of 
Pillar 2 of the New Basel Accord. For example, with regard to the procyclicality debate, macro stress 
testing might give some indication of how the impact on bank capital during a recession would vary 
depending on the type of recession (eg whether it is consumer- or export-led). 
This paper describes a number of approaches used in the financial stability area of the Bank of 
England to stress test banks and draws on our experience from last year, when stress tests were 
carried out as part of the IMF’s FSAP on the United Kingdom. We also outline some of our future 
proposed work. 
2. Possible  approaches to stress tests 
Stress tests involve a number of elements. These are illustrated in Figure 1. First, plausible and 
internally consistent but “challenging” macroeconomic scenarios or single factor sensitivity tests need 
to be devised to illustrate possible extreme downside risks - so-called “tail events” (Box (1)). Whereas 
the former assess the impact on credit risk of a combination of changes in macroeconomic variables, 
the latter focus on the change in one variable and assume that other variables remain unaffected. 
Second, these scenarios (or sensitivity tests) need to be mapped into measures of increases in credit 
default by loan type or borrower (Box (2)). Third, changes in borrower default need to be translated 
into bank credit losses, ie allowing for recoveries, by loan type (Box (3)). 
In a “bottom-up” approach, each bank would estimate the increase in credit losses on its entire 
portfolio (allowing for the possibility that losses are interdependent). This was one of the approaches 
adopted in the FSAP exercise (see below and also Hoggarth and Whitley (2003)). Such an approach 
has the advantage of evaluating banks’ portfolios at a detailed level of disaggregation. It also provides 
information on how banks themselves assess the likely impact of adverse events on the quality of their 
loan book. However, such estimates are not based on applying a consistent framework across banks 
and, in any case, would not be practical for the authorities to carry out on a frequent basis. An 
alternative approach is to adopt a “top-down” methodology. Here macroeconomic scenarios are linked 
to banks’ aggregate sectoral losses. 
The various approaches described below aim to estimate the impact of a variety of common macro 
shocks on the credit losses of the UK banking system (steps (1) to (3) in Figure 1). There are a 
number of approaches that can be used to carry out macroeconomic stress tests, and we have 
adopted an eclectic approach building upon the stress testing exercise conducted last year for the 
UK FSAP.  
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Figure 1 
Framework for macro stress testing UK banks 
(1)   (2)   (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Map into 
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Adverse 
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(eg 99.5% 
confidence level; 
worst historical 
cases) 
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(and credit 
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(Expected) 
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current 
portfolios 
Increase in each 
bank’s overall loss 
  Threshold for bank 
failure 
 
Second-round 
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banks 
                   
 
(a) Structural  
 model  (MTMM) 
(b) VARs 
                
 
UK FSAP:  bottom-up:  banks estimated their own losses - the major UK banks were given simulations  
   from an extended version of the BoE’s macroeconometric model (MTMM) 1(a).  
   They gave us back (4), having done (2) and (3) themselves. 
  top-down:  equations on banks’ aggregate provisions  -  direct from MTMM simulations (1)(a) to (4) without intermediate steps. 
  top-down sectoral:  equations on banks’ sectoral write-offs  -  linking equations to an extended version of the MTMM 
  (1(a)==>3) 
  VAR model including sectoral write-offs  -  1(b)==>3  
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3. UK  FSAP
1 
In the UK FSAP of 2002 we constructed specific macroeconomic scenarios derived using an 
extension of the Bank of England’s then current Medium-Term Macroeconometric Model (MTMM). 
The outputs from these scenarios were supplied to 10 large UK banks as inputs to their own 
assessments (the “bottom-up” approach). The UK-owned institutions were asked to consider the 
effects on a consolidated basis. However, the results do not, in all cases, capture the impact on all 
their non-bank and foreign operations. The tests were conducted in spring 2002, and firms assessed 
the impact on their profit and loss account and regulatory capital during the first year (until March 
2003) - compared with their own internal forecast or base line.
2 
The “bottom-up” results were returned to us and compared with our own analysis of the impact of the 
scenarios on UK banks (the “top-down” approach). The latter used aggregate reduced-form 
relationships linking changes in macroeconomic variables to banks’ aggregate loan loss provisions. 
The scenarios 
Four scenarios were chosen in the UK FSAP exercise to include both domestic and global events, and 
shifts in both the demand for and supply of goods and services in the economy: 
1.  Decline of 35% in world and UK equity prices. The macroeconomic transmission is largely 
through household balance sheets, whereby lower household sector wealth reduces 
household consumption and hence aggregate GDP. But the impact on demand and output is 
partly offset by an easing in monetary policy in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The 
main adverse consequences for the financial system are predicted to occur in the corporate 
sector, as a result of lower GDP and profits. 
2.  Decline of 12% in UK house and commercial property prices. Since housing accounts for 
one half of UK households’ net worth, the personal sector’s balance sheet deteriorates and 
UK household consumption is reduced. Output is lower than otherwise, but the adverse 
effect is a little smaller than under the first scenario. Similarly, the monetary authorities are 
assumed to respond by cutting UK interest rates. Nonetheless, the net effect is that 
mortgage arrears increase relative to base, even though they remain low by historical 
standards. Corporate sector income is expected to fall relative to base as a consequence of 
weaker aggregate demand, and capital gearing rises because of the decline in commercial 
property prices. This shock is expected mainly to hit banks with a high concentration of 
property loans. 
3.  A one and a half percentage points unanticipated increase in UK average earnings growth 
(reflecting a step increase in real reservation wages). This supply shock boosts personal 
incomes and consumption. But the transmission to higher inflation induces a rise in official 
interest rates. Overall there is a marginal decline in GDP compared with the base case. Both 
corporate and household sectors are adversely affected. Despite higher household incomes, 
there is a rise in income gearing, which implies an increase in household mortgage and 
credit card arrears. Corporate profits fall relative to base and corporate liquidations increase. 
4.  A 15% (initial) unanticipated depreciation in the trade-weighted sterling exchange rate. This 
results in higher inflation and, in response, nominal interest rates increase. Nonetheless, 
since wages and prices adjust only gradually, there is a temporary depreciation in the real 
exchange rate, which, in turn, boosts net export volumes. On balance, GDP growth is higher 
than otherwise. The corporate sector benefits from higher net exports, and profits rise 
relative to base, although aggregate corporate liquidations increase because of the increase 
in interest rates and therefore gearing. However, this scenario also hurts the household 
sector through the shift in the terms of trade and the rise in interest rates. Consequently, 
mortgage arrears increase substantially. 
                                                       
1  This section draws on Hoggarth and Whitley (2003). 
2  Some banks could not provide quantitative estimates beyond a one-year horizon.  
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The error variances from the equations in the Bank of England’s MTMM were used in order to 
calibrate the initial shocks. The equations were estimated from 1987, so the conditional variances 
include the early 1990s recession. But this approach could not be applied for the shocks to the 
exchange rate and equity prices.
3 In these two cases, historical variances and peak-to-trough 
estimates were used. 
In choosing the threshold probability for the shock to be regarded as a scenario worthy of analysis, a 
balance needs to be struck. On the one hand, if the probability were set too high - and thus the size of 
shocks too low - there would be little impact. Nothing would be learnt about how the banking system 
would fare in a period of stress. On the other hand, if the size of shocks were extremely large, there 
would be almost no possibility of the event occurring. The size of the events chosen broadly 
corresponds to an event three standard deviations away from the mean.
4 
All the scenarios were estimated relative to a base case that was broadly consistent with the central 
outlook underlying the Bank’s Inflation Report for November 2001. The impact of the shocks was 
estimated over a 12-month period (2002 Q2 to 2003 Q1) to provide an internally consistent set of 
outcomes for key macroeconomic variables, as well as for components of corporate and household 
sector balance sheets. The alternative scenarios also assumed that UK monetary policy (interest 
rates) reacted to the shocks according to a Taylor rule, which sets interest rates as a function of 
inflation and the output gap.
5 The assumed policy responses were intended to be broadly consistent 
with an inflation targeting monetary policy regime (but they should not be interpreted as indicating how 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee would respond in practice). This assumption played 
an important role in the scenarios in stabilising some of the macroeconomic responses to the events. 
Results 
Bottom-up approach 
Panel (i) in Table 1 shows the overall impact of the four scenarios on the UK-owned banks’ P&L 
account, while Graph 1 shows details of the effects on individual banks.
6 Panels (ii) to (iv) in Table 1 
show the impact of the scenarios as a percentage of the banks’ annual operating profits (averaged 
over the previous three years), risk-weighted assets and Tier 1 capital, respectively. 
Overall, the effects on UK banks were estimated to be quite small in all the scenarios. Aggregating 
across the major UK-owned banks, the adverse impact on profits varies from an average in scenario 1 
(fall in world equity prices) of £432 million (23% of annual profits) to £146 million (6% of profits) in 
scenario 3 (rise in wage pressure). Looking at individual banks, only one was estimated to have 
suffered a loss of more than 50% of average annual profits (over the past three years) or 10% of 
Tier 1 capital. This happened in the first scenario (panels (b) and (c) in Graph 1): the marked fall in 
equity prices reduces profits in a range of activities - loans and trading income, and, in some cases, 
income on asset fund management and insurance business. Overall, the results suggest that under all 
scenarios the major UK banks would have a sufficient cushion in profits to absorb the shocks without 
depleting their capital. The size of the impacts (after allowing for tax) is also small in relation to 
UK-owned banks’ risk-weighted assets - the biggest adverse impact, under scenario 1, is in the range 
of 0.12 to 0.56% of risk-weighted assets (1.5 to 10% of Tier 1 capital). 
                                                       
3  Although the macroeconomic model has rules of thumb for the determination of equity prices and the exchange rate, the 
equations do not have standard error distributions. 
4  Assuming a normal distribution, multiplying the standard deviation of the variable by 2.8 would imply a 5 in 1,000 occurrence 
(ie 99.5% confidence level) - suggesting an extreme but still plausible event. However, applying a normal distribution will 
understate the likelihood of extreme events if the tails of the distribution are fat. 
5  See Taylor (1993). 
6  The impact of the scenarios on the foreign-owned institutions are not reported since they only cover a part of their business 
and are therefore not estimated on a comparable basis.  
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Table 1 
Impact of stress scenarios performed by major  
UK-owned banks on profits
1, 2 
(i) In millions of pounds sterling 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Mean –432  –252  –146  –214 
Median –408  –195  –57  –81 
Standard deviation  305  219  270  359 
(ii) As a percentage of banks’ annual pre-tax profits
3 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Mean –22.7  –15.0  –6.3  –1.8 
Median –18.4  –8.1  –6.1  –3.4 
Standard deviation  21.2 18.1  8.3 18.4 
(iii) As a percentage of (end-2001) risk-weighted assets 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Mean  –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 
Median  –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 
Standard  deviation  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
(iv) As a percentage of (end-2001) Tier 1 capital 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Mean  –4.9 –2.9 –1.5 –1.5 
Median  –4.4 –2.8 –1.2 –0.9 
Standard  deviation  3.3 2.2 2.1 3.6 
1  Negative implies stress test reduces profits, positive implies an increase in profits (relative to base).   
2  On a group basis 
other than HSBC which relates to HSBC Bank.   
3  Measured, on average, over previous three years. 
Source: Major UK-owned banks. 
 
Aggregate top-down approach 
As a complement to the stress test results provided by the large banks, as part of the FSAP we also 
estimated the effects on the provisions made against aggregate credit losses by the major UK-owned 
commercial banks measured on a consolidated basis using a single equation econometric model. 
These top-down simulations compared the model-based predictions for banks’ new provisions 
charged against profits under each scenario relative to a base case.  
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Graph 1 
Impact of stress scenarios
1 on 
UK-owned banks - bottom-up approach 
Panel (a): Impact on pre-tax profits
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1  For any given scenario the rank ordering of banks varies across the four measures shown above.   
2  The blue line 
represents the range across individual banks, the pink diamond shows the mean. 
Source: Major UK-owned banks. 
 
The econometric model for banks’ provisions is a reduced form showing the relationship between key 
macroeconomic (and bank-specific) variables and banks’ new provisions on their total loan book (see 
Pain (2003) for a further explanation). An advantage of this top-down approach is that the impact of 
the scenarios can be estimated beyond the one-year horizon.
7 
One of the preferred equations estimated using a small panel dataset on the UK bank is 
3 1 4 04 . 0 09 . 0 08 . 0 07 . 0 3 . 6
1
ln − − + + − − − =
−
it t t t
it
it L M RR wgdp gdp
prF
prF
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆  
 +  0.04propshit–1 + 3.3herfit–1 (1) 
75 . 0
2 = R  
                                                       
7  However, a potential disadvantage of this approach is that it is based on the average historical relationships rather than on 
the impact on banks’ current loan portfolios.  
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where:  
•  prF is the new provisions charge against profits relative to loans and advances 
•  ∆gdp is annual growth in real GDP 
•  ∆wgdp is annual growth in world real GDP 
•  ∆RR is a measure of ex post real interest rates based on base rates and the GDP deflator 
•  ∆M4L is the annual growth in M4 lending 
•  propsh is the share of total (sterling) lending to domestic commercial property companies 
•  herf is the Herfindahl measure of concentration of the domestic (sterling) loan portfolio 
•  ∆gdp is significant at the 5% level, all other variables significant at the 1% level 
Using the equation, the impact of a shock was calculated as the difference between the “shocked” 
value and a base case. 
Table 2 summarises the average impact on provisions for the top-down simulations for those UK-owned 
commercial banks that also provided individual bottom-up estimates for the effects on provisions. 
As in the case of the bottom-up approach, the largest effect on UK banks’ provisions occurs in 
scenario 1: the 35% fall in world equity prices. Under this scenario, reductions in two of the key 
macroeconomic variables in equation (1) - UK and world GDP growth - increase the new provisions 
charge, more than offsetting the impact of lower real interest rates. 
Overall, the top-down simulations also suggest that the likely increases in credit losses arising under 
all scenarios are quite small - all scenarios would result in an increase in banks’ new provisions 
charges, both in the first year and cumulatively after three years, of less than £200 million on average 
(less than 10% of annual profits or 2% of Tier 1 capital). 
4.  Sectoral top-down approach 
One drawback with the top-down approach used in the FSAP is that provisions are only available on 
UK banks’ total loan book. Actual write-offs (losses) on loans to UK residents, on the other hand, are 
available at a (broad) sectoral level on a quarterly basis back to the early 1990s (Graph 2).
8 These 
more disaggregated data can be used to assess the impact of adverse shocks on different 
components of banks’ loan portfolios. Bank write-offs relate to the losses (net of recoveries) made by 
UK-owned banks on loans initiated from their UK-resident banking operations.
9 
Two approaches have been adopted to stress testing banks’ sectoral write-offs: (1) we have integrated 
sectoral write-offs with a version of the Bank’s extended Medium-Term Macroeconometric Model (see 
Benito et al (2001) for details of the latter); and (2) we have included sectoral write-offs in a small VAR 
model. 
 
                                                       
8  Quarterly data at a sectoral level (households, corporates, etc) are not reported for all banks. For banks that only report 
annual sectoral data, the quarterly data have been derived by applying the annual sectoral shares to the aggregate 
quarterly data. 
9  Therefore, the data exclude losses made by overseas branches and subsidiaries of UK-owned banks and losses made by 
domestically located non-bank businesses.  
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Table 2 
Potential impact of stress test scenarios on 
UK commercial banks’ provisions charge against profit
1 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
 
£m  % of 
profits
2 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital
3 
£m  % of 
profits
2 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital
3 
£m  % of 
profits
2 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital
3 
£m  % of 
profits
2 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital
3 
First year                     
Mean  –172 –5.7 –1.6 –47 –1.6 –0.4 –4  –0.1 0.0 –31 1.0 0.3 
Median –182  –6.1  –1.6  –50  –1.7  –0.4 –4  –0.1 0.0 –32 1.1 0.3 
Standard 
deviation  39 0.8 0.3  11  0.2  –0.1  1 0.0 0.0  7 0.1 0.0 
After three 
years
4                      
Mean –130  –4.3  –1.2  –3  –0.1  0.0 –53 –1.8 –0.5 –110 –3.7 –1.0 
Median –138  –4.6  –1.2  –4  –0.1  0.0 –56 –1.9 –0.5 –116 –3.9 –1.0 
Standard 
deviation 29  0.6  0.2  6  0.0  0.0 12 0.2  –0.1 25  0.5  0.2 
1  A negative sign means a decrease in profits, a positive sign an increase in profits. Banks were Barclays, Lloyds TSB, HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland.   
2  Percentage of previous three years’ 
annual profits.   
3  End-2001 Tier 1 capital.   
4  Cumulative impact. Assumes that the key macroeconomic variables return to base by 2004 Q4. 
Source: Bank of England calculations. 
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Graph 2 
UK-owned banks’ write-offs
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1    Corporates include both financial and non-financial companies. Other 
household sector includes unincorporated businesses and non-profit 
organisations. 
Source: Bank of England. 
 
 
 
Graph 3 
Sectoral delinquency rates and asset prices 
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A  Extending the Medium-Term Macroeconometric Model (MTMM) for sectoral write-offs 
The aim here is to extend the Bank’s MTMM to include equations for sectoral write-offs. Only variables 
that are currently available in the MTMM are used to ensure that the impact of any initial shock can be 
traced through using an internally consistent scenario. 
Bank lossesi = pi*lgdi*loansi 
where i refers to the sector, p is the probability of default and lgd is the percentage written off given 
default (ie 1 minus the recovery rate). Rearranging then 
bank lossesi/loansi ≡ write-off ratei = pi*lgdi 
Actual sectoral defaults or credit deteriorations are used to proxy pi. There are no UK data on 
lgd/recovery rates, so we use variables that are likely to affect the recovery rate, in particular sectoral 
asset values. So the modelling strategy is: 
write-off ratei = f(default proxyi, recovery rate proxyi) 
In the corporate sector, default is proxied by the corporate liquidation rate (the number of insolvencies 
in the period/number of registered firms). In turn, in the MTMM the corporate liquidation rate depends 
positively on corporate income gearing, changes in real interest rates and changes in net corporate 
debt/GDP and negatively on the growth in UK output and commercial property prices. The recovery 
rate is proxied by commercial property prices. 
For the household sector, the proportion of credit card debt in arrears is used as the default proxy in 
the equation for credit card write-offs. The recovery rate is assumed to be zero. Credit card arrears, in 
turn, depend on household income gearing and the number of active credit card balances. As 
discussed in Cox et al (2004), the latter is used as a proxy for supply side influences such as 
UK banks’ recent move down the credit quality spectrum, the adoption of more aggressive marketing 
techniques and generally the increase of competition in the UK credit card market during the past 
decade. 
There is no further breakdown of household write-offs by loan type available on a consistent basis 
back to the first half of the 1990s, implying that non-credit card household write-offs (“other household 
sector”) include write-offs on both secured debt (ie housing loans) and unsecured consumer debt 
(other than credit cards). Therefore, both mortgage and consumer credit arrears are included in the 
equation for other household sector write-offs to capture the likelihood of default. In the MTMM, in 
turn, mortgage arrears depend positively on mortgage income gearing and unemployment and 
negatively on undrawn housing equity and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of first-time buyers (as a proxy 
for the credit risk of new borrowers).
10 
House prices were included in the initial specification for other household sector write-offs to capture 
the impact of changes in loss-given-default on mortgage debt but were not found to be statistically 
significant. This may be attributable to house prices and mortgage arrears being dependent on the 
same factors. So that in periods when mortgage defaults decline, house prices increase. As seen from 
Graph 3, mortgage arrears have been on a steep downward trend since the early 1990s while over the 
same period house prices have been on a steep upward trend.
11 Therefore, the impact of mortgage 
arrears on other household write-offs may not only be capturing the impact of changes in default but 
also changes in loss-given-default. 
Results 
The equations linking variables of sectoral fragility to bank write-offs are shown in Table 3. All 
variables enter contemporaneously, other than credit card arrears, which have a four-quarter lag. This 
suggests that as households become fragile, they first delay paying their consumer debt and only later 
                                                       
10  Cox et al (2004) argue that banks undertake high LTV mortgage lending with customers they judge to be of high credit 
quality. 
11  The simple correlation coefficient between house prices and mortgage arrears over the period is –0.81.  
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their mortgage debt.
12 These simple equations seem to explain past movements in bank write-offs 
quite well, especially on corporate and other household loans (panels (a) to (c) in Graph 4). The 
equations capture the steady decline in corporate write-off rates throughout the past decade, the 
gentler decline in other household write-offs and, to some extent, the initial decline and then rise over 
the past five years in credit card write-offs.
13 
 
Table 3 
Sectoral write-off rate linking equations, 1994 Q1 to 2002 Q4 
Household sector 
Explanatory variables  Corporate sector 
Credit cards  Other 
Corporate liquidation 
ratet 
1.275 
(0.00) 
  
Commercial property 
pricest 
–0.002 
(0.00) 
  
Mortgage arrearst     0.038 
(0.00) 
Credit card arrearst–4   1.133 
(0.00) 
0.107 
(0.00) 
1995 Q4 dummy  0.207 
(0.00) 
 0.075 
(0.00) 
R-bar squared  0.94  0.59  0.80 
DW 1.5  1.4  2.0 
Number of observations  36  36  36 
Note: Corporates include both non-financial and financial companies. Other household sector consists of secured household, 
unsecured household (other than credit cards), unincorporated businesses and non-profit organisations. Corporate 
liquidation rate is the number of corporate insolvencies as a percentage of the number of registered companies. Mortgage 
arrears are the number of mortgage arrears more than six months as a percentage of the number of mortgages outstanding. 
Credit card arrears are the value of credit card balances in arrears by more than three months as a percentage of the value 
of all credit card balances. 
p-values in parenthesis. All variables are significant at the 1% level. 
 
The sectoral linking equations can only be estimated from 1993, since when sectoral write-off data 
have been available. However, the equations explaining the default proxies are estimated back to the 
late 1980s. This implies that the scenarios for sectoral defaults, at least, are based on relationships 
that include the last boom and bust in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s/early 1990s. 
We then repeated the four scenarios used in the FSAP and traced through the impact on banks’ 
sectoral write-offs. The results are shown in Table 4 below. 
As seen in Table 4, again the impact on banks’ balance sheets is estimated to be quite small. None of 
the scenarios results in write-offs increasing (relative to base) in the first year or cumulatively after 
three years by more than 2% of the banking system’s Tier 1 capital. However, there are differences 
across the scenarios. Since income gearing is an important determinant of sectoral default, particularly 
for the household sector, the assumed interest rate response has an important impact on write-offs in 
the simulations. 
                                                       
12  It may also partly reflect differences in the definition of when a late payment is categorised as an arrear. For mortgages the 
variable is measured as arrears of more than six months, and for credit cards it is arrears of three months or more. 
13  However, credit card arrears seem to overstate credit card write-offs somewhat in 1997-98 and understate them in 2001.  
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Graph 4 
Sectoral write-off rate linking equations - 
actual vs fitted 
Panel (a): Corporates
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Panel (c): Other household
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1  Financial and non-financial companies.   
2  Non-credit card household plus unincorporated businesses and non-profit 
making organisations. 
Source: Bank of England. 
 
Monetary policy is assumed to ease in response to the sharp fall in equity and property prices 
(scenarios 1 and 2 respectively). The consequent fall in household income gearing implies that the net 
effect is to reduce household sector write-offs albeit slightly. In scenario 2, although mortgage arrears 
(and thus implicitly mortgage write-offs) rise relative to base, this is more than offset by an implied 
reduction in (non-credit card) unsecured write-offs due to the fall in household income gearing. 
However, corporate sector write-offs increase in both these scenarios despite a decline in corporate 
income gearing. This is partly attributable to the initial fall in output growth (relative to base). Also in 
scenario 2, the large fall in commercial property prices increases both corporate liquidations and loss-
given-default. 
In contrast, scenarios 3 and 4 - an increase in earnings growth and a depreciation of sterling 
respectively - lead to higher inflation, which is met by a tightening of monetary policy. Under both 
scenarios, there is a rise in households’ income gearing - interest payments increase and disposable 
incomes fall. The impact of sterling depreciation (scenario 4) on the fragility of the corporate sector is  
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partially offset by an increase in export volumes and output (relative to base) over the simulation 
period. Consequently, in this scenario the write-off rate for companies rises by less than for 
households. 
 
Table 4 
Impact of stress test scenarios on 
UK banks’ sectoral write-offs
1 
(a) First year 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Sector 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
Corporates 115 0.1 545 0.5  40  0.0 125 0.1 
Credit cards  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0 
Other 
household 
sector 
–15 0.0  20 0.0  0  0.0  90 0.1 
Total 100  0.1  565  0.5  40  0.0  215  0.2 
(b) After three years
2 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Sector 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
£m 
% of 
Tier 1 
capital 
Corporates 270 0.3  1,845 1.8  930  0.9  470  0.5 
Credit cards  –105  –0.1  –70  –0.1  115  0.1  250  0.2 
Other 
household 
sector –350  –0.4  –50  –0.1 465  0.5  1,050  1.0 
Total –185  –0.2  1,725  1.6 1,510  1.5  1,770  1.7 
1  A positive sign implies an increase in write-offs, a negative sign a reduction in write-offs compared with the base case.   
2  Cumulative impact. Assumes that the key macroeconomic variables return to base by 2004 Q4. 
 
B VAR  approach 
We also adopted another approach to derive the scenarios and to apply the shocks directly to UK 
banks’ actual losses (write-offs). We produced a vector autoregressive (VAR) model consisting of a 
limited number of macroeconomic variables and bank write-offs. 
The choice of macroeconomic variables included in the VAR was motivated by the existing literature 
on reduced-form macro models, for example Blake and Westaway (1996), Ball (1998) and Batini and 
Haldane (1999). So the VAR consisted of UK output (relative to a simple trend), nominal short-term 
interest rate, the real exchange rate, the annual RPIX inflation rate and banks’ write-off rate (net write-
offs divided by the value of loans outstanding). 
Since quarterly data on bank write-offs are available only from 1993 Q1, the data period covers only 
the recovery phase of the early 1990s economic cycle. It also implies that some of our variables show 
little variation over the period - in particular retail price inflation and the banks’ base rate, which have  
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remained in a relatively narrow range of between 1.75 and 3.5% per annum and between 4 and 7.5% 
respectively over the past decade. We experimented with including house price inflation in the VAR 
since it shows more movement over the past decade and might be expected to affect bank write-offs. 
As a check on our results, we also used annual data on the main UK banks’ consolidated published 
accounts to derive aggregate banking system data back to 1988 (ie to capture the economic 
downturn). Our data are spliced in 1993 Q1, and the annual data before 1993 are interpolated onto a 
quarterly basis. 
We tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Though the tests were not 
always able to reject a unit root at the 10% level, the p-values were never far from 10%. Given that it is 
well known that the ADF test suffers from low power and we expect that the series should be mean-
reverting, we treat them as such. 
In order to ensure that the shocks are uncorrelated, we applied a Cholesky decomposition (with a 
degrees-of-freedom correction). The variables in the model were ordered in ascendance according to 
the likely speed of reaction to any particular shock. Variables at the front end of the VAR are assumed 
to affect the following variables contemporaneously but only to be affected themselves by shocks to 
the other variables after a lag. Variables at the bottom of the VAR, on the other hand, only affect the 
preceding variables after a lag but are affected themselves immediately. The financial variables - 
interest rates and the exchange rate
14 - were ordered at the bottom of the VAR, implying that they 
react instantaneously to shocks in the real-side variables, whereas the other variables react only after 
a lag following shocks to the financial variables. Output was ordered after write-offs, reflecting priors 
that the economic cycle affects bank losses in the United Kingdom only after a lag (Hoggarth and Pain 
(2002)). 
In principle, inference in VAR models is sensitive to the choice of lag length based on the different 
information criteria and appropriate lag length can be critical. If a large number of lags is included, 
degrees of freedom are eroded. If the lag length is too small, important lag dependencies may be 
omitted. We used both the Akaike and the Schwarz information criteria to set the lag length equal to 2 
for all the various specifications reported below. 
Results 
Using post-1993 data, none of the shocks had a statistically significant impact at the 95% confidence 
level on write-offs either in the basic aggregate VAR or where house prices are included. As 
mentioned above, this might reflect a lack of variation in a number of the variables. However, once the 
estimation period is taken back to 1988, then some shocks have a statistically significant impact. In 
particular, shocks to output always had a negative and statistically significant impact on write-offs.
15 
In the sectoral VAR for private non-financial companies (PNFCs) we also included PNFCs’ income 
and capital gearing,
16 in addition to the macroeconomic variables discussed above, since, as 
discussed earlier, there is evidence that these types of financial variables also affect corporate 
liquidations in the United Kingdom. The maximum impact seems to occur more quickly than suggested 
by the VAR including aggregate write-offs - after nine months for changes in output (relative to trend) 
and six months for changes in interest rates. 
But in both the aggregate and the corporate VARs, the economic impact was quite modest - the 
impact of a 1% adverse shock to output on write-offs never exceeded 2% of Tier 1 capital. 
                                                       
14  Although the real exchange rate is included in the VAR, short-term movements are driven by the nominal exchange rate. 
15  We also experimented with including world output in the VAR, since it was found important by Pain (2003) in affecting UK 
bank provisions. But this variable did not have a significant impact on write-offs. One reason that may explain the different 
result is that provisions data relate to the consolidated entity, including overseas branches and subsidiaries, whereas the 
(post-1993) write-off data relate only to the UK-based operations. The latter are likely to be less affected by adverse shocks 
abroad. 
16  Income gearing is defined as interest payments as a percentage of PNFC pre-tax profit and capital gearing is PNFCs’ net 
debt as a percentage of net debt plus net equity.  
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5.  Why do the stress tests not have a bigger impact on UK banks’ 
balance sheets? 
One factor helping to explain the small size of the effects is the higher quality of UK banks’ loan books 
than in the late 1980s. Over the past decade, there has been a widespread decline in the ratio of “risk-
weighted” assets (used by regulators to calculate capital requirements) to total assets and an increase 
in geographical asset diversification. Also, aggregate sectoral data on domestic loans suggest that the 
composition of the large UK-owned banks’ retail loan book has shifted away from riskier unsecured 
lending to relatively safer mortgage lending over the past decade.
17 And within the mortgage market, 
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) are now much lower than in the late 1980s. For example, the proportion of 
UK banks’ new mortgages with LTVs over 90% has fallen since the mid-1990s, from almost 50% to 
below 30%.
18 Consequently, it would probably take a marked decline in house prices to cause a 
significant increase in losses on housing loans. UK banks’ corporate loan portfolios also appear to be 
of a relatively high quality. Estimates indicate that almost half of major UK banks’ corporate exposures 
have internal ratings equivalent to A or above. 
Second, the impact of the scenarios used in the “bottom-up” approach in the FSAP was estimated 
only over a one-year horizon. In practice, it takes longer than one year for the full impact of the shock 
to work through. Some of the defaults caused by an overall credit deterioration will not occur until later 
years. One bank extended the simulations beyond the one-year horizon. This analysis suggested that 
its provisions for retail credit losses could be on average six times higher in the second year than in 
the first. And, as a rough ready reckoner, another bank suggested that the peak effect on retail 
provisions was around three times the first-year effect and was likely to occur three years after the 
initial shock. 
Also, in the MTMM scenarios at least, the policy reaction tempers the impact of two of the shocks 
(scenarios 1 and 2). Monetary policy is assumed to adjust partly to offset declines in output as well as 
rises in inflation (given the Taylor reaction function). So, for example, the decline in house prices is 
followed by a reduction in interest rates that moderates the impact on output, and thus on corporate 
liquidations and housing arrears. The large losses that UK banks incurred following asset price 
deflation in the early 1990s were accompanied by a sharp increase in nominal interest rates, and 
hence income gearing. In consequence, output fell substantially and liquidations and arrears rose 
sharply. 
The analysis also ignores how banks and their creditors, including other banks, would react faced with 
a weakened bank. Although individual bank actions might be designed to reduce potential losses, the 
collective results might intensify economic stress - through a credit crunch, for example - and weaken 
banks’ positions further. In extremis, if the shock were big enough to cause the failure of a large bank, 
this might have a direct impact on the capital, or even solvency, of other (counterparty) banks.
19 Wells 
(2002) provides the back end of this analysis through estimating the impact via the interbank market of 
a single bank failure on other banks. But this analysis assumes implicitly that the initial shock is 
specific to a particular bank. 
It might also be the case that in order to maintain a high credit rating and to have access to interbank 
funding, the large UK banks hold capital in case of more extreme events than are considered here 
(Jackson et al (2002)). 
6.  Extensions and future work 
The above top-down analysis focuses on the impact of adverse macroeconomic scenarios on the 
UK banking system as a whole. One planned extension is to compare the impact across the major 
UK banks at a bank by bank level. The size of the impact on any individual bank will depend on both 
                                                       
17  These changes reflect the impact of demutualisation as well as shifts in banks’ portfolios. 
18  See Bank of England (2002), Part III. 
19  See Elsinger et al (2002) and Wells (2002).  
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the composition and quality of its portfolio (Box (4) in Figure 1) and the amount of capital it has to 
withstand the shock (Box (5)). An important aspect of the latter will be to assess the threshold beyond 
which a decline in capital would be likely to result in a bank “failure”. This top-down analysis could also 
be bolted onto the interlinkages work to estimate the second-round effects of a bank failure on other 
banks (step (6) in Figure 1). The impact on sectoral losses discussed above focused on loans to 
UK residents. This analysis could be extended to include loans to non-residents. 
The above approach has concentrated on accounting measures of bank losses. We also plan to 
complement this work through estimating the impact of adverse macroeconomic shocks on financial 
market measures of credit losses. This analysis will involve first generating macroeconomic scenarios 
either from the Bank of England’s macroeconomic model or from a more parsimonious VAR model. 
The macroeconomic variables from this first stage will be included together with industry-specific (and 
firm-specific) variables in a model to explain firm equity returns.
20 The forecast equity returns will then 
be plugged into a Merton model to provide estimates of the conditional probability of default for each 
firm. The final stage will be to use information on loss-given-default and the pattern of banks’ 
corporate exposures to generate projected bank-specific losses for different adverse macroeconomic 
scenarios. 
7. Conclusions 
We have carried out a range of stress tests on the UK banking system using a number of approaches 
building upon the analysis carried out as part of the UK FSAP. The estimated potential losses in no 
case exceeded annual profits or represented a large fraction of banks’ capital. However, some caution 
needs to be exercised with these results. 
The results are likely to be sensitive to the nature and specification of the macroeconomic stress tests. 
The size of the shocks is based largely on historical experience averaged over normal times and 
periods of stress, rather than taken from stress periods alone. The latter, by definition, occur 
infrequently and may be conditioned by the precise circumstances at the time. There may be sharp 
discontinuities in economic behaviour and relationships in crisis periods. The analysis also ignores 
how banks and their creditors, including other banks, would react faced with a weakened bank. 
Although individual bank actions might be designed to reduce potential losses, the collective results 
might intensify economic stress - through a credit crunch, for example - and weaken banks’ positions 
further. It might also be the case that banks set capital as an insurance against more extreme events 
than have been considered here. 
An important factor explaining the relatively modest impact of some of the scenarios derived from the 
MTMM on UK banks’ profits is the assumed monetary policy reaction in response to a change in the 
outlook for inflation. Although the particular numerical results may depend on the precise specification 
of the interest rate reaction rule, to the extent that inflation targeting serves to stabilise some of the 
macroeconomic responses to unanticipated shocks, it will have beneficial implications for the stability 
of the UK financial system. 
Overall, these estimates suggest that the stability of UK banks is unlikely to be threatened by a range 
of plausible adverse shocks, especially given that most UK banks are currently very profitable by 
international standards and have capital ratios well in excess of the regulatory minimum. Nonetheless, 
this exercise emphasises the importance for the authorities, and for banks themselves, of continuing 
to develop quantitative techniques which can be used to assess the resilience of the financial system 
to potential shocks. 
                                                       
20  Pesaran et al (2003) adopt a similar approach. They use a global VAR in combination with an equity returns equation to 
produce estimates of defaults for 119 firms worldwide.  
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